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ZANZIBAR, PORTUGAL, AND MOZAMBIQUE: 
RELATIONS FROM THE LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY TO 1890* 
By Norman R. Bennett 
The evolving cultural region of the Swahili-speaking peoples of the east coast of 
Africa, stretching southwards past the island of Mozambique, fell under the 
general domination of the Portuguese masters of the western Indian Ocean after 
the beginning of the sixteenth century. Lacking the manpower effectively to 
garrison even the most important holdings of their world-wide empire, the 
Portuguese never made any significant attempt to occupy most settlements along 
the East African coast. When the attacking Arabs of Uman won their great 
victory at Mombasa in 1698, the Portuguese permanently withdrew to posts south 
of Cape Delgado, leaving the northern coast open to the Arabs, except for a brief 
reoccupation of Mombasa in the 1720s. By the end of the eighteenth century, the 
Swahili peoples found themselves intermittently subject to controls imposed by 
both Arabs and Portuguese. The Arabs, under the BuSaidi dynasty of Uman, 
were beginning to build the important state based at Zanzibar; the Portuguese, 
their European homeland in serious political decline, were clinging as best they 
could to their remaining settlements. The Swahili polities naturally preferred to 
live independent of either the Portuguese or the Arabs, but their long-present 
inability to combine into larger, more powerful states effectively left them 
subject to the influence of one or the other. 
Despite their weaknesses, the Portuguese in East Africa, an independent 
administration since 1752, remained an important factor in the Cape Delgado 
region. The northernmost posts of the Portuguese were located in the Querimba 
Islands, with the principal establishment at the small port of Ibo. But the 
garrisons, too weak to repel any determined attack, merely served as symbols to 
mark Portuguese claims to the northern coast.1 As the strength of the Arabs of 
Zanzibar grew, the Mozambique authorities continually worried about their 
limited hold, particularly toward the end of the century when Arabs, Africans, 
and Europeans, ignoring the Portuguese regulations restricting commerce, 
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avoided their poverty-stricken ports for those under Arab or Swahili control. 2 
Because of the resulting loss of revenues, added to a natural - if impractical -
desire to regain their lost empire, the Portuguese of Mozambique, particularly 
from the 1780s, suggested to Lisbon the undertaking of offensive moves against 
the Arabs, many of the schemes centering around the placing of an ally in power 
in Mombasa. There were no resources to spare for adventures and the proposals 
passed without implementation.3 
Without a secure hold on the region until the final capitulation of 
Mombasa to the BuSaidi in 1836, the Arabs left the Portuguese in peace: the 
southernmost Arab post, since 1785, was at Kilwa. The Swahili living between the 
Arab and Portuguese posts consequently, during the beginning decades of the 
nineteenth century, enjoyed a practical independence conditioned only by the 
nearness of the closest foreign garrison. The Swahili residing to the immediate 
north of the Portuguese centers, seeking to profit from the European presence, 
often held positions within the administration of Mozambique, their acceptance 
of salaries and other honors allowing the Portuguese to maintain the fiction of 
their sovereignty over the northern coast.4 But whatever the nature of their 
relationship to the Portuguese, these Muslim rulers and their subjects naturally 
felt more drawn to the Arabs of Zanzibar, particularly after the great BuSaidi 
ruler, Said bin Sultan, turned his attention to East Africa. Prominent families, for 
example, sent their sons to Zanzibar for a proper Muslim education; 5 others 
maintained commercial links via the dhow trade which tied their coast to the 
Arab island. 6 
The politics of this Muslim coastal world were marked by shifting 
political relationships between the various Swahili rulers and outsiders. A natural 
unresolved problem in the unstable flux was the location of the boundary 
separating the territories claimed by the Arabs and Portuguese. The influence of 
the Arabs was limited: "from Cape Delgado to Quiloa," said a British visitor, "it 
would appear there is little authority acknowledged to any but the kings or 
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chiefs residing there."7 Although the Portuguese normally claimed the coast 
stretching to Cape Delgado (10° 40"), by the early nineteenth century their last 
garrison occupied Ibo. This weakness allowed the Swahili residing around what 
was described in 1886 as "the vast and splendid bay" of Tunghi, to become the 
focus of a long argument between Zanzibar and Portugal, which ended in the 
1880s by involving all of the Great Powers represented in East Africa. The 
Swahili lived in villages, Tunghi to the north and Minangani to the south, on 
each side of an estuary then known as the Minangani River. 8 The Portuguese 
later admitted that they had possessed no authority over the Tunghi region until 
1765, claiming in that year the local ruler had accepted a commission in the 
Mozambique service. 9 Whatever the truth of the assertion, the Swahili ruler of 
Tunghi maintained his freedom of action, his exactions upon the Portuguese 
becoming serious enough around 1778 for an expedition to be sent against him.10 
The administration rebuilt its fort at Ibo in 1791, but the disorder in the northern 
region - subject for many years to the devastating raids of the Sakalava of 
Madagascar - persisted, causing the Tunghi sultan to seek effective support from 
both the Portuguese and the Arabs. 11 Since meaningful Arab aid was not 
available until the 1840s the Swahili accepted the reality of the nearby Portuguese 
presence, threatening to leave their service for the Arabs when salaries went 
unpaid or military support (usually in the form of supplies) was lacking. The 
Portuguese, not greatly worried about the threats because of the lack of an 
alternative to them, fitfully answered the Swahili requests.U 
The arrival in the mid-1820s of an energetic governor for Mozambique, 
Sebastii'io Xavier Botelho, led to the first significant negotiations between Arabs 
and Portuguese relating to their mutual problems. The new governor, aware of 
the increasing Umani involvement in coastal affairs, feared their armed descent 
upon his command, at once seeking additional military support from Lisbon.13 
But Botelho realistically accepted the futility of such requests, soon recognizing 
the dependence of Mozambique upon the provisions and other merchandise 
7
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11
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April 1817, MC 60. 
13Botelho to Torres, two letter~-of 30 December 1825, MC 75; Sebastiao Xa'Vier Botelho, Resumo para · 
Servir de lntroducqlw d Memdria Estattstica sObre os Domtnios Portuguezes-na Africa Oriental 
(Lisboa, 1834), 75-77. Hafkin, "Northern Mozambique," reports for 1824 a Mozambique fear of Arab and 
Swahili attack (p. 177). 
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carried by Arab vessels, probably the most significant trading partners of the 
Portuguese. 14 He soon had written to Said bin Sultan concerning commercial 
matters. 15 Said was prepared to deal with the Portuguese, one of his relatives, Sayf 
bin Amad, arriving at Mozambique in February 1826. According to Botelho the 
Arab ruler asked for a treaty of friendship, the succeeding deliberations ending 
in an agreement of 22 February 1826, relating to both commercial and political 
matters. When Said received the treaty he made several additions, returning it to 
Mozambique in 1828. The revised accord, signed by Sayf and Botelho on 28 
March 1828, and ratified by Said in Zanzibar in October, generally provided for 
Jess restrictive trading regulations for the subjects of each power. One important 
article dealt with the boundary between the Arab and Portuguese territories: 
according to the treaty the dominions of the sultan did not reach beyond 
"Mugau" (the region south of Kilwa), while the Portuguese holdings ended at 
Tunghi. 16 The advantage belonged to the Arabs: their territorial limits remained 
indistinct and subject to interpretation while the Portuguese had retreated from 
their normal claim to Cape Delgado. Ratification in Portugal was necessary 
before the treaty became binding, but, as often happened, no immediate orders 
reached Mozambique concerning the agreement's fate. 17 
Said bin Sultan, learning that his subjects still were charged the old 
customs rates when trading in Mozambique, in 1830 sought news of the 1828 
accord. 18 By then the province had a new governor, Paulo Jose Miguel de Brito, a 
more orthodox official than Botelho, who regarded the 1828 treaty as too 
favorable to the Arabs. Over 200 Arab vessels yearly visited Mozambique, he 
noted, while only a few Portuguese traveled to Zanzibar; he also felt that the 
agricultural imports brought by the Arabs had an adverse impact upon 
production in Mozambique. The governor nevertheless had no wish to antagonize 
his powerful neighbor, cautiously explaining to Said that the treaty had not been 
ratified, but offering, in the interests of friendship, to honor the article awarding 
lower import duties if the Arab vessels arrived in port with the documents 
required by the accord. Brito suggested to the Zanzibar sultan that additional 
negotiations be undertaken in Mozambique to clear up the difficulties he 
perceived in the 1828 treaty, but it does not appear that Said sent the requested 
delegate. The sultan did, however, arrange for his vessels to carry the documents 
required for visiting Mozambique. 19 Both the Zanzibar and Mozambique 
governments were busy with other matters for the next few years, Said bin 
14
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Sultan striving for the final conquest of Mombasa, the shaky Portuguese 
administration becoming embroiled in hostilities during 1830-31 with the Swahili 
ruler of Quitangonha. During the latter war a Muslim boycott of Mozambique 
Island caused a severe food shortage, while the Muslims of both the coast and 
Zanzibar sent aid to Quitangonha. Some Portuguese saw such activity on the part 
of Said bin Sultan as an indication that he planned the conquest of their 
northern coast. 20 
Said bin Sultan in reality had little interest in warfare with the 
Portuguese, and relations between Zanzibar and Mozambique soon returned to 
their normal course. In 1840 new governor Joaquim Pereira Marinho wrote the 
sultan announcing his arrival, despite indications that relations had been broken 
off between the Arabs and Portuguese; the Arab replied in friendly fashion to a 
request for renewing relations. 21 In September 1843 Governor Rodrigo Luciano de 
Abreu e Lima visited Zanzibar on a British vessel to talk with Said concerning 
contraband and slave trade matters, concluding arrangements on both. 22 
The various contacts between Zanzibar and Mozambique serve as a 
backdrop for affairs in the northern border region. Whatever the details of Arab-
Portuguese commercial dealings at an official level, the Swahili rulers of the 
north persisted in what the Portuguese regarded as a contraband trade. 23 At the 
same time, however, the Swahili continued their relationship with the Portuguese; 
Assani, the ruler of Tunghi, for example, complained to the governor in 1828 that 
the officer in charge of the Cape Delgado district had seized some of his slaves 
for his own use. Recognizing the usefulness of the Swahili's support, the governor 
quickly resolved the affair in his favor, seizing the opportunity of the 
correspondence to place Assani officially on the Portuguese list of paid 
indigenous officials in 1829.24 The payments apparently were continued through 
most of the 1830s,25 probably partially in response to the frequent exhortations 
received from Lisbon for establishing customs posts in the northern district. 26 
During an 1832 visit the local Portuguese commander reported Assani living 
within governmental regulations, 27 but as the decade progressed, and the 
20
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Portuguese became more familiar with the growing power and prosperity of 
Zanzibar, 28 the Mozambique authorities grew increasingly concerned about their 
limited authority in the region. Often the only information received from the 
Cape Delgado ports came to the capital via Zanzibari vessels, while the governor 
in 1837 had to admit that, instead of following orders to strengthen the northern 
garrisons, he had withdrawn troops from them for use in Mozambique town. 29 In 
an 1840 report a visiting official admitted that the district was in sad 
administrative condition, its only significant trade carried on by Arab craft. 30 
The declining Portuguese presence, contrasted to the increasing presence 
of Arabs and others from Zanzibar, naturally led the Swahili rulers to reconsider 
their existing relations with each. In 1844 an Indian merchant gained a footing in 
Tunghi, openly dealing with Arab visitors. When a small Portuguese force was 
despatched to prevent the illegal trade, Muhammad (or Ahmad) bin Sultan, ruler 
of Tunghi since about 1837, refused to obey their commands, compelling the 
Portuguese to leave his territory. Subsequent Portuguese pressure may have 
caused the Indian's departure, but Muhammad was left alone since he remained 
ready to resist any direct Portuguese interference. Nonetheless, continuous 
contacts were maintained between Tunghi and the local Portuguese, the latter 
endeavoring to follow orders from the governor to end all misunderstandings 
with the Swahili ruler, the efforts hindered however by Muhammad's contention 
that the Portuguese were remiss in providing him the financial and other support 
owed because of his place in their administration. 31 With only about seventy 
soldiers in all of the Cape Delgado district, the administration clearly could do 
little more than exhort the coastal peoples to follow Portuguese regulations. 32 An 
additional sign of their collapsing authority was the 1848 suspension of the Cape 
Delgado commander for involvement in the illegal slave and contraband trade. 33 
At about this time one of the few non-Portuguese visitors to the Cape 
Delgado region, the French commercial investigator Loarer, fortunately included 
Tunghi in his itinerary. In his conversations in August 1848 with Muhammad bin 
Sultan, Loarer reported that the Swahili chieftain claimed independence of both 
Portugal and Zanzibar; 34 the Frenchman accepted the validity of the assertion 
and awarded Muhammad an authority reaching about ten days (around 120 miles) 
into the interior. Tunghi enjoyed a busy trade, even including some American 
visitors, while several Zanzibari were present during Loarer's stay. Loarer had 
28
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31
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7 March 1846, 11 November 1846, NJH. 
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33
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asked the Portuguese governor about his hold on the north coast, receiving the 
standard assertions that Muhammad was a paid official and his port was closed 
to foreigners. In Zanzibar he learned from the important BuSaidi official, 
Sulayman bin Hamid, that Said bin Sultan had named Muhammad governor, 
explaining this course by asserting that although Cape Delgado once had been a 
recognized boundary with the Portuguese, the movement of the Arabs southward 
had brought Tunghi into the Zanzibar dominions. 35 There does not appear to be 
any justification for a BuSaidi claim to Tunghi at this early date - Said bin 
Sultan, for example, had informed the British in 1844 that his territories ended at 
Cape Delgado. 36 But Sulayman's opinion obviously presaged trouble for the 
Portuguese. 
Muhammad bin Sultan continued following policies designed to increase 
the wealth of his polity. In 1850, for instance, the British seized an Indian at 
Tunghi for participation in the slave trade. 37 The Portuguese reported the 
continuation of the contraband trade, even while claiming that Muhammad was 
receiving his usual salary. 38 When the Cape Delgado commander, Jeronymo 
Romero, remonstrated against the commercial activities, Muhammad replied that 
he had never received his subsidy, and retorted that he required the revenues 
gained from trade to meet his expenses. Romero sent a vessel to Tunghi in 1852, 
to check on the presence of Frenchmen seeking slaves, without apparently 
causing much friction. Then in early 1854 the Portuguese learned that a Zanzibari 
governor and garrison had arrived in Tunghi, apparently by agreement with its 
ruler, to signal its incorporation into Said bin Sultan's realm. 39 Governor Vasco 
Guedes de Carvalho e Menezes decided to react carefully, blaming the 
occupation on unauthorized actions of the Zanzibar customs master during the 
absence of the sultan, and delegating ex-governor Joaquim Pinto de Magalhaes to 
visit Zanzibar to resolve the questions. 40 The death of Said bin Sultan in 1856 and 
the subsequent quarrel over the succession effectively distracted the Zanzibar 
administration from any consideration of the border problem. 
Unable to act, the Portuguese simply maintained a close watch on Tunghi 
affairs, waiting for some opportunity to return their former subordinate to the 
fold. Receiving cordial replies to his correspondence, Romero sent a naval officer 
to Tunghi in early 1858, offering its ruler his former status. Muhammad simply 
replied that he now was a subject of the Sultan of Zanzibar. Romero claimed 
that the Swahili leader found the Zanzibar presence onerous, but the assertion is 
35
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d'Afrique exCcutCe par le brick le DucouCdic pendant les ann6es 1846-47-48 & 49, Rapport commerciale, 
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36
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37
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38
carvalho to Alves, 24 December 1852, M~mbique, Alfandegas, ma~s 1875-78, 1379, AHU. 
39
Romero, MemdriQ: 27~'29; :ROmero 'to Bandeira, 15 March ·1855, Correspondence with British 
Representatives ... Relating to the Slave Trade, 1877, FO 541/21; Picalugal to Magelhes, 25 March 1854, Bacar 
Machamo to Souza, 16 March 1854, Picalugal to Lobo, 29 April 1854, GG 232. 
40
Menezes to UM, 26 July 1854, CG 13. 
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without other corroboration. 41 The civil strife in Zanzibar over the succession 
briefly raised Portuguese hopes that the Arabs might have to evacuate Tunghi, 
but Majid's victory quickly dashed that dream. 42 Meanwhile Tunghi continued to 
function outside the Portuguese system, Portuguese vessels paying duties as other 
foreigners when they visited their former port. By 1859 the Mozambique 
governor considered that the contraband trade there was "enormous." 43 
Muhammad bin Sultan died in 1860; his successor Abdulaziz bin Sultan did 
nothing to alter the existing situation. 44 It is worth emphasizing at this time that 
a principal reason for the caution of the Portuguese governors was the vital role 
played by Zanzibar in the economy of Mozambique, a role which continued in 
importance in succeeding years with the opening of the Suez Canal and the 
spread of steam-driven vessels throughout the reaches of the western Indian 
Ocean world. Zanzibar served as the link for vessels trading between 
Mozambique, the Suez Canal, and Bombay: the Portuguese nation lacked 
sufficient vessels of its own for servicing their colony. Another related factor 
was the importance of Ibo's contribution to the economic life of the colony; by 
this period the port was the headquarters of a busy French trade in sesame, 
cowries, and other products. 45 
Thus it is not surprising that Mozambique's governor admitted his 
inability to regain Tunghi, and suggested to Lisbon a negotiated solution to the 
problem. 46 In 1861 the government authorized Jolio Tavares de Almeida to 
conclude a treaty settling the Tunghi affair in Portugal's favor and to gain a 
commercial accord similar to those held by the Europeans and Americans 
resident in Zanzibar. 47 Almeida arrived in Zanzibar in October 1861, engaging in 
difficult negotiations - "the filtration of Portuguese, through Kiswahili and bad 
French, into Zanzibar Arabic, is not favourable to the precise expression of 
diplomatic ideas," said British consul Lewis Pelly - ending with a treaty 
concluded on 28 December. The problem of language was not the only factor 
complicating the deliberations. Pelly shared the British contempt for the 
Portuguese - Livingstone said that "a more used up syphilitic race does not exist 
41
Almeida to UM, 26 October 1858, enclosing Muhammad bin Sultan to Romero, received 6 September 
1858, CG 16; Romero, Supplemento, 150; Romero to Sec. Gov. Moz., 6 January 1858, 19 February 1858 
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44 
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45
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in the world" - and threw his considerable support behind Majid. The sultan had 
no interest in removing his men from Tunghi, refusing to respond to Almeida's 
proffers. According to Pelly, the Portuguese official threatened to break the 
negotiations if Majid did not give in, the sultan standing firm after receiving 
British encouragement. In the end Almeida decided to conclude a commercial 
treaty, basically a most-favored-nation arrangement, leaving the unresolved 
border affair to a subsequent negotiation; he reasoned that any other conclusion 
could lead to a crisis disrupting the important trade between Zanzibar and 
Mozambique. The governor also admitted that his province's military strength 
was no match for that of Zanzibar. 48 Before becoming valid the treaty needed to 
be accepted by the Portuguese government and returned for ratification in 
Zanzibar. The Lisbon authorities did order its acceptance, but their Mozambique 
subordinates never proved able to manage a visit to Majid in Zanzibar. 49 
Meanwhile the Zanzibaris retained Tunghi in their dominions. In 1872 
Barghash sent soldiers to act against Africans raiding in the Cape Delgado 
region, his actions being accepted without notice by the foreign community in 
Zanzibar. 50 When the important British official, Bartle Frere, visited the East 
Coast in 1873, including Tunghi Bay, he concluded that "the Southern and Eastern 
limits of . . . the sultan's possessions are fixed."51 Nonetheless, the British, vital 
allies of the BuSaidi, had not really made any official decision about the location 
of the border, usually remaining content to cite Cape Delgado as the limit. 52 The 
continuing affair did not mar the peaceful relations between Zanzibar and 
Portugal, the latter continuing powerless to act within the means existing in 
Mozambique. In July 1874, for example, new governor Jose Guedes de Carvalho e 
Menezes disembarked in Zanzibar for friendly talks while proceeding to 
Mozambique, concluding an arrangement for the appointment of a consul to 
serve the resident Goan community. The governor was impressed enough by his 
reception to recommend that his government award a medal to Barghash; the 
suggestion was accepted and Barghash was decorated in March 1875.53 
By the late 1870s the Portuguese were ready to undertake some cautious 
action in the Cape Delgado district to help protect their claimed rights against 
48
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the increasing European activity in East Central Africa. 54 A new district 
commander, Perry da Camera, began offering vassalage agreements to local 
rulers, although his governor, not wishing to rouse Zanzibar unnecessarily, did 
not give formal recognition to the accords. 55 The governor, Francisco Maria <la 
Cunha, had stopped in Zanzibar in September 1877, informing Barghash that an 
agent was coming to conclude the long-delayed commercial treaty; after the talks, 
despite Barghash's denial, he contended that the sultan had agreed to a recession 
of Tunghi. 56 The renewed Portuguese interest, also expressed in diplomatic 
exchanges in London and Lisbon, led to discussions among British officials 
concerning what policy should be adopted for the Portuguese-Zanzibar dispute. 
The British in East Africa were firmly on the sultan's side. John Kirk noted that 
Tunghi had been held by Zanzibar since Said bin Sultan's time, capping his 
argument with the conclusion that it was not in the British interest to encourage 
the extension "of so miserable a rule as that of the Portuguese in East Africa." 
The sentiment was later matched by Consul Henry O'Neill, when he spoke 
regarding the effort to end the slave trade in Arab and Portuguese territories: 
"the fact is the sultan has the power and will to enforce his treaty obligations. 
The Portuguese have neither." 57 In Britain, Lord Derby, less interested in friction 
with the Portuguese that his East African subordinates, concluded that the 
Tunghi region was really Portuguese territory, but he recommended avoiding any 
involvement in the affair until absolutely necessary. The British ambassador in 
Lisbon concurred, later informing Lord Salisbury that if direct action was 
avoided, the Tunghi problem would "pass into a state of permanent coma."58 
The British had underestimated Portuguese tenacity. Spurred by the 
persistence of Lisbon, Governor Cunha wrote Barghash concerning new 
negotiations. The sultan agreed to talk, informing Kirk that he was prepared to 
offer the Portuguese the same commercial terms possessed by other powers. 59 
Arriving in Zanzibar in early October 1879, Cunha first attempted merely to get 
the commercial sections of the unratified 1861 agreement reaccepted. The 
Zanzibari negotiator refused, adamantly insisting on a new treaty. Cunha, 
obviously not trusting the British, had declined Kirk's offer of aid, thus further 
increasing his difficulties. The governor was, said Kirk, "a haughty man and gives 
himself airs," significantly adding, "but I don't think he will get what he comes 
for." Faced with the failure of his mission, Cunha accepted the Zanzibari 
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position, working out a new commercial accord. The governor explained to 
Lisbon that the differences with the 1861 accord were minimal, but he did not 
hide his disappointment when talking with the French representative in 
Zanzibar, charging that Kirk had worked with Barghash against Portuguese 
interests. Kirk simply noticed that Cunha had committed "fatal mistakes" during 
the pourparlers, gaining for his country thereby "a secondary and subordinate 
position" in Zanzibar. Cunha's efforts to reopen the Tunghi question were even 
less successful, the Zanzibaris for the first time advancing a firm claim to the 
coastal lands as far as the settlement of Minangani. When the Arabs threatened 
to end the negotiations, both commercial and political, if Cunha persisted in his 
demands, the governor, reasoning as Almeida had in 1861, left the issue to the 
future. But Cunha did gain one concession, an agreement by Barghash for the 
appointment of a special commission within six months to resolve the disputed 
border. 6° Kirk informed the Foreign Office that the commission agreement was 
of concern to Britain, the possible negotiations requiring close attention because 
of the British interest in Tunghi Bay. A surprised Salisbury replied that he was 
"not aware that Her Majesty's Government have any rights in Tangy Bay," 
requesting explanations from Kirk. The consul in return stressed the concessions 
made by BuSaidi rulers enabling the British to pursue slavers in the region; the 
unimpressed Foreign Office simply noted that Kirk's view should be remembered 
if negotiations ever took place.61 The Portuguese later discovered differences 
between the Arabic and Portuguese versions of the treaty, but when Barghash 
refused to recognize anything but the Arabic wording, the Portuguese backed 
down: the accord was ratified in Zanzibar on 18 June 1883.62 
The Arab position in Tunghi Bay thus appeared increasingly secure. 
When the British consul for Mozambique, traveling in a Portuguese vessel, 
attempted to visit Tunghi, the inhabitants refused him landing rights until he 
proved he was not Portuguese. In April 1881 another Briton found an Arab 
governor with a garrison of seventy soldiers at Tunghi. 63 Despite their continuing 
military weakness, the Portuguese remained determined to displace the Arabs; 
individual officers, sharing the imperialistic fervor of the 1880s, began to think of 
aggressive action. Even during the 1879 negotiations, for instance, the naval 
officers present with their governor had talked openly of seizing Tunghi. 64 
Words became actions during the next few years, the Mozambique administration 
taking new steps in 1882 to strengthen their northern district. Early in the year a 
60
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Portuguese vessel steamed northward with orders to probe along the coast to 
ascertain the strength of the Zanzibari occupiers, in the process avoiding all 
hostilities with the Arabs and Swahili. Upon reaching the contested region, the 
Portuguese were prevented from landing. Barghash later disavowed the conduct 
of his men, since the Portuguese ostensibly merely were seeking provisions, but 
the realities of the situation were obvious to all. The Portuguese had to limit 
their actions to the appointment of a dynamic commander at Ibo, Jose 
Raymondo de Palma Velho, and the issuing of a regulation of 19 December 1882 
authorizing the establishment of a customs post at Minangani. 65 
Responding to Palma's desire for action, the Mozambique administration 
sought authorization and support from Lisbon for a forward policy: they won 
approval for a cautious advance. 66 Initial steps included the naming of Swahili 
subordinates to posts in the northern region, among them a father and son, 
Chinga Joiio Calheiros and Joiio Calheiros, who were named for the Tunghi area. 
Much remains unclear about the two Calheiros, but it appears they deceived the 
Portuguese, instead serving the interests of Zanzibar. 67 
The continuous jockeying for advantage around Cape Delgado suddenly 
was interrupted when the treaties signed by Carl Peters in late 1884 inaugurated 
the partition of Barghash's dominions. The Portuguese quickly realized that the 
sultan's occupation of the Tunghi region could lead to the area falling under the 
sway of one of the Great Powers. Kirk, for example, in late 1884 had requested 
and received a "spontaneous" declaration from Barghash not to award a 
protectorate within his dominions, which he said reached to Tunghi Bay, without 
British consent. 68 The new Portuguese attitude was manifested by the 1884 
appointment of the well-known Portuguese explorer, Alexandre Alberto da 
Rocha de Serpa Pinto, as consul in Zanzibar. Because of duties elsewhere in East 
Central Africa, however, Serpa Pinto did not take up effective residence in 
Zanzibar until 1885. To counter his absence, the Mozambique administration sent 
Jose Joaquim de Almeida to Zanzibar in July 1885, with instructions to revise the 
existing commercial accord and reopen the border issue, meanwhile informing 
Bargash that the Portuguese planned to occupy the right bank of the 
Minangani. 69 
The pressures upon Zanzibar mounted rapidly. The German claims for a 
protectorate behind the coast opposite Zanzibar were recognized by Barghash, 
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abandoned by his British allies, in August 1885. Then a three-power commission -
Britain, France, and Germany - was named to determine the exact extent of 
Barghash's coastal dominions. When the commissioners arrived in Zanzibar, 
Serpa Pinto immediately sought to ascertain the southern limits of their interest, 
the Lisbon authorities simultaneously seeking the naming of a Portuguese 
delegate among its members. But none of the three powers favored the proposal 
and, much to the dismay of Lisbon, the commission proceeded on its work 
without Portuguese representation.7° Serpa Pinto rushed into negotiations with 
the beleaguered Barghash on December 24th, striving to gain the coastal territory 
as far north as Cape Delgado, drawing from it a line westward to the Ruvuma 
River. On the 30th Serpa Pinto increased the pressure, informing Barghash that 
Portugal, as earlier reported by Almeida, was sending troops into the disputed 
region. On 8 January 1886, Mozambique governor Augusto de Castilho Barreto e 
Noronha telegraphed Serpa Pinto that the Portuguese had been fired on while 
occupying an island in Tunghi Bay and hoisting their flag on the right bank of 
the Minangani. The governor threatened additional action if satisfaction was not 
forthcoming for the actions of the Zanzibari garrison. In a conversation with the 
French consul, Serpa Pinto claimed that the sultan had agreed in principle to the 
Portuguese advance, but that on its arrival the expedition found the occupying 
Zanzibaris had not received orders from Zanzibar. There is no confirmation for 
the Portuguese consul's version of events. When Barghash remained firm, Serpa 
Pinto gave the sultan the choice of immediate compliance or of a break in 
relations with Portugal. The aroused consul apparently lacked the authority for 
the ultimatum, however, since, when the British sought clarification in Lisbon, 
the threat was withdrawn. Barghash meanwhile demurred on taking any action 
until he learned of the Tunghi events directly from his governor, eventually 
discovering that his men had not resisted the arrival of the Portuguese on the 
off-shore island, though they stood prepared to fight if any incursion on the 
mainland was attempted.7 1 
The expected visit to Tunghi Bay of the British, German, and French 
commissioners had prompted the Portuguese military measures. In January 1886 
the Portuguese arrived on the disputed coast, but finding it likely that any effort 
to raise their flag meant hostilities, they instead proceeded to Tekomaji Island. 
The governor of Tunghi protested against the occupation without forcing 
hostilities. Later the Portuguese landed on the right bank of the Minangani; the 
Arabs, after some peaceful arguing, withdrew and left the Europeans in 
possession of the small settlements located there. The claim advanced in 
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Zanzibar that the· Arabs fired on the Portuguese was not substantiated. 72 With 
their occupation completed the Portuguese, obviously endeavoring to reduce both 
local and international opposition to their action, issued new customs regulations 
for the region similar to those in force in Zanzibari territory.7 3 Thus the 
Portuguese were present in Tunghi Bay when the vessels of the commissioners 
arrived in late January. The delegates visited both Arabs and Portuguese. The 
former, under their governor Said bin Salim al BuSaidi, at first appeared ready to 
resist their landing, since they felt the newcomers were Portuguese. After 
investigating the peaceful situation the commissioners continued on their voyage, 
learning later to their great surprise that Palma had reported their withdrawal 
before the resolute attitude of the Portuguese.7 4 
Meanwhile in Zanzibar the irrepressible Serpa Pinto persisted in 
pressuring Barghash. When a minor quarrel erupted in April 1886 over the status 
of a Goan - a convert to Islam who had reconverted to Christianity - Serpa 
Pinto broke relations with Zanzibar without waiting for approval from Lisbon, 
charging that Barghash had been guilty of conduct "offensive to the national 
dignity." The ostensible reason was what Kirk described as a "certain amount of 
irritation" upon Barghash's part concerning the Portuguese consul's conduct in 
the quarrel - he had roughly dismissed one of Serpa Pinto's frequent missives by 
referring him to a subordinate with this message: "You are fond of much writing 
and I am a man of much business." The affair was settled without undue 
disruption, with Barghash agreeing to receive a Portuguese commissioner within 
six months for a negotiated settlement of the border impasse. Serpa Pinto, in ill 
health during much of his stay in Zanzibar, left the island in mid-ApriI. 75 
The Portuguese offensive actions, both around Cape Delgado and in 
Zanzibar, had caused considerable displeasure in London. When Salisbury 
learned of the expedition to Tunghi Bay, he requested Lisbon "strongly to defer 
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any action which might be construed into a hostile act against the Sultan." The 
Portuguese, promising to issue orders to their forces to avoid conflict, replied that 
their planned actions were undertaken to increase the efficiency of their policies 
against the slave trade, contending that Zanzibar in any case did not claim the 
right bank of the Minangani. When the news of the occupation, along with the 
conduct of Serpa Pinto, was evaluated, the Foreign Office decided that either the 
Portuguese government had intentionally deceived them or their subordinates 
had disobeyed orders. 76 The French and the Germans shared the British view.77 
Lacking allies and effective military forces, the Portuguese were left, even after 
their success in Tunghi Bay, in a potentially very dangerous position. 
For the moment, however, a crisis was avoided and both Arabs and 
Portuguese limited their endeavors to peaceful competition for the support of 
inhabitants of the Tunghi region.78 The Great Powers were more upset at 
Portugal's disregarding their advice than at its aggression toward Zanzibar. The 
Foreign Offices of both Britain and Germany went no farther than stating their 
displeasure, despite their commissioner's report that Zanzibar territory stretched 
to Tunghi Bay, not really caring whether the boundary lay there or at Cape 
Delgado.7 9 
In January 1877 the Portuguese renewed the negotiations broken off at 
Serpa Pinto's departure from Zanzibar, with Governor Castilho proceeding to 
Zanzibar as head of the delegation. Castilho shocked Barghash by asserting 
vigorously that the sultan's letter agreeing to the deliberations had formally 
conceded Tunghi Bay to the Portuguese. Barghash angrily refused Castilho's 
patently false claim, concluding to the governor that, since his borders had been 
fixed by agreement between Britain, Germany, and France as a result of their 
commissioners' reports, he no longer had the ability, even if he had the desire, to 
modify them. With the negotiations stalled, Castilho received authorization in 
early February from Lisbon to seize Tunghi Bay. On the 11th he sent an 
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ultimatum to Barghash demanding the cession of the disputed region. When the 
sultan declined, Castilho broke relations with Zanzibar and prepared for war.80 
Portuguese vessels were already present in Tunghi Bay awaiting word 
from Castilho; Barghash, aware of their presence, was prepared to despatch a 
large force to resist any landing, but British consul Frederick Holmwood 
persuaded the sultan to rely upon the support of Britain and the other powers. 81 
While the diplomats talked the Portuguese acted, bombarding and seizing the 
lightly manned Zanzibari posts, after they had refused to surrender, on 23-27 
February 1877. Barghash's commander, Ali bin Said, retreated into the bush with 
his remaining forces, to make preparations for future resistance. The Portuguese 
also seized the sultan's unarmed steamer, Kilwa, then on its usual trading run to 
the Cape Delgado region. Barghash once again talked of sending troops to the 
area, this time led by his British general, Lloyd Mathews, "a step," he said, which 
"he regretted he had not taken before," but again the sultan deferred to 
Holmwood's advice to remain on the defensive. The Portuguese took advantage 
of the lack of resistance to push their occupation north to Cape Delgado, 
founding a new center, Palma (named after the commander of the expedition) to 
safeguard their gains. 82 By March and April the Portuguese occupiers had been 
attacked by the Arabs and their African allies; the men supposedly acted without 
orders from the sultan. The details of the fighting, unfortunately, remain unclear. 
Even in 1889 the Portuguese were insecure enough in their new positions to 
withdraw their men nightly from Tunghi to the safety of their off-shore vessels. 
As far as commercial conditions were concerned, the victory was meaningless. 
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Arab and African traders simply moved their business to the better markets 
located to the north of Portuguese territory. 83 
Both the British and the Germans felt compelled to make some effort to 
uphold Barghash's position, their attitude still prompted more by their annoyance 
at the Portuguese disregard of advice than of support for the no-longer-important 
ruler of Zanzibar. 84 An especial irritant to the British was the fate of over 
twenty British Indian families, residents of the Tunghi settlements who had lost 
all their property because of the Portuguese invasion: their claims totaled 
$102,000.85 The Germans, little interested in the affair, nevertheless followed the 
British lead. Bismarck had received a telegram from Barghash requesting 
assistance in February; he had committed himself to assist in ending the 
hostilities through the appointment of another commission, an alternative 
acceptable to Zanzibar and Britain. 86 Thus in July 1887 Visconde de Castilho, as 
consul, and the well-known explorer H. Capello da Brito, as special commissioner, 
arrived in Zanzibar with instructions to hold firm for a border at Cape Delgado, 
but to secure, if at all possible, the line of the Ruvuma. The Portuguese clearly 
came to ratify the results of their military victory, not to negotiate over the fate 
of Tunghi Bay. Lloyd Mathews acted for the sultan in the talks, both sides 
repeating their time-honored arguments. Barghash, now losing interest in his 
steadily diminishing dominions, realized the futility of the deliberations and 
informed Germany and Britain that he left the affair for them to resolve. The 
83
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18 
commissioners recessed at the end of July, leaving the problem to their 
governments in Europe. 87 
The negotiations moved to Lisbon, but the declining interest of Britain 
and Germany left the issue in little doubt. 88 By September the British were 
wondering what Barghash might accept "short of absolute surrender," the sultan 
breaking through the growing apathy by suggesting to the British consul that he 
call a holy war against the Portuguese. He was informed of the "inconvenience of 
the proceeding," since Zanzibar was defenseless against attack from the sea, and, 
although it was not said, would not receive British assistance. 89 Without any new 
formulas to advance, and with the Portuguese government prepared to fall before 
relinquishing control of Tunghi Bay, the affair receded into the distant 
background, especially after the beginning of the Arab-German war in 1888.90 
Thus the long quarrel between the Arabs and the Portuguese, dating from 
the arrival of Vasco da Gama in the waters of the western Indian Ocean, came to 
an end. The peoples of the region between Tunghi Bay and Cape Delgado had 
enjoyed their continuing practical independence because of the weakness of the 
Portuguese and the relative strength of Zanzibar. The fall of the BuSaidi 
dominions to the Germans and British left the inhabitants of the northern coast 
with no alternative but to be included among the subject populations of 
Mozambique. 91 
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